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Review essay
No Forbidden Zone in 
21st Century
Celebrating 20 years of the Hong Kong journal
DAVID BARTEL *
In October 2010, the bimonthly Hong Kong journal Ershiyi shiji (二十一世紀 – 21st Century) celebrated its twentieth anniversary with thepublication of its 121st issue. This would therefore seem a suitable oc-
casion on which to retrace the history and the particularities that have en-
abled it to become and remain one of the cornerstones of the Chinese
community’s “thinking” press. Founded by a couple of historians, refugees
in Hong Kong, and published by the Institute of Chinese Studies (中國文化
研究所 – Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo) of the Chinese University of Hong
Kong (香港中文大學 – Xianggang zhongwen daxue, CUHK), and on the pe-
riphery of the People’s Republic (PRC), the journal might have been simply
a vain attempt to revive a dying Chinese liberal movement. However, Er-
shiyi shiji rapidly became a journal of reference in which Chinese intellec-
tuals could reflect on, and debate, some of the intellectual conundrums
that spread across China and the world throughout the 1990s, in the fore-
front of which were the globalisation of the economy and of capitalism.
Although the journal prints only 3,500 copies per issue, it nonetheless of-
fers a special forum in which the intellectuals of Greater China can express
contradictory opinions. In so doing, it echoes the “thinking press” in Conti-
nental China, whose best-known review, Reading (讀書 - Dushu) has a
print-run of more than 100,000. (1) It is not unusual for authors to write for
both publications and for the polemics to echo one another, within the
limits that exist in the People’s Republic. (2) Although Ershiyi shiji is difficult
to find on the mainland outside university research centres, the most im-
portant articles are now invariably found on the Internet, which in China
does not initiate debate so much as it offers an enormous resonance
chamber for the exchange of ideas. (3)
The aim of this article is two-fold. Firstly it hopes, through tracing the his-
tory of a major scholarly journal, to review the survival of a liberal move-
ment – associated with the Enlightenment in the 1980s – which, despite
many difficulties, has left a lasting impression on Chinese society. Next, by
retracing the intellectual issues of the late 20th century, we will attempt to
outline the basic characteristics of a contemporary intellectual arena in
which a renewed national story and a completely new relationship with a
globalised world are being played out, overlap, and jostle one another. We
will therefore begin by retracing the origins of the journal, which presup-
poses a detour via the careers of Jin Guantao (金觀濤, born in 1947) (4) and
his wife Liu Qingfeng (劉青峰, born in 1949), its joint founders. A long con-
versation with Chen Fangzheng (陳方正, born in 1939), key figure in the ar-
chaeology of the journal, threw light on the delicate period that led from
the repression of 4 June 1989 to the founding of the journal and publication
of its first issue in October 1990. We will see how the thinking that led to
the creation of Ershiyi shiji in a sense foreshadows both the establishment
of a part of Chinese cultural life in an intellectual periphery in the making,
and the continuity of a liberal school of thought that met difficulties on the
mainland. Indeed, whilst in the PRC the situation at the beginning of the
1990s remained relatively tense, a movement of intellectual emancipation
had already been set in motion centring on the twin poles of Hong Kong
and the Anglo-American academic diaspora. (5)
* David Bartel is a doctoral student at CECMC (EHESS, Paris) and an associate researcher at CEFC. He is
writing his doctoral thesis on the singularities of the careers of the intellectuals and historians Jin
Guantao and Liu Qingfeng.
1. Wang Xiaoming gives this figure in the “Dushu” entry in the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese
Culture (Routledge, 2009), p. 164. For Ershiyi shiji, circulation is a little less than 3500, but the approx-
imate figure has been confirmed by Liu Qingfeng. The exact figure remains confidential, however.
(Email dated 13/12/2010). 
2. The title of the present article is a direct reference to that of Zhang Yongle, “No Forbidden Zone in
Reading? Dushu and the Chinese Intelligentsia,” New Left Review, no. 49, January-February 2008, 
pp. 5-26. 
3. For the Internet in China, two articles by Éric Sautedé are particularly instructive: “Les leurres de la
modernité – Internet, information et crise du SRAS en China (The snares of modernity – Internet, in-
formation, and the SARS crisis in China),” Perspectives chinoises, no. 76, 2003; and more recently (April
2007) on the website of La vie des idées, “Une révolution sans illusion – Internet et liberté d’expression
en Chine (A revolution with no illusions – Internet and freedom of expression in China),”
http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Une-revolution-sans-illusion.html (10/11/2010).
4. We have persisted in giving the date of birth in brackets of many of the people mentioned in this text.
The traumatic events of the second half of the twentieth century and the speed of change over the
last 20 years means that communities with shared experiences change very quickly, and generations
who are very close intellectually often have very different experiences of China and the world. We
would like to take the opportunity here to thank anonymous readers and the editorial team of China
Perspectives, whose advice was extremely valuable in writing this article. 
5. Du Weiming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” Daedalus, Spring 1991.
ABSTRACT: The Hong Kong journal Ershiyi shiji (21st Century) occupies a special place in the radical reconfiguration of the Chinese
intellectual landscape that followed the traumas, both national and international, of 1989. On the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, we
retrace the founding of the journal and the aspects that have made it unique in the world of the “thinking” press, and question the
normalisation in China of the intellectual internationalisation of the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
KEY WORDS: intellectual life, history of ideas, liberalism, postmodernism, nationalism, press, Hong Kong. 
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Next, although it would be impossible to deal in detail with all the ele-
ments that over the last 20 years have made China what it is today, we
will follow the thematic classification of the main intellectual develop-
ments that structured thinking in China in the 1990s, as put forward by
Beijing philosopher and historian Xu Youyu (徐友漁 born in 1947), an im-
portant figure in Chinese liberalism and a regular contributor to the jour-
nal. (6) This classification, though necessarily incomplete and schematic,
seems nonetheless to give both an interesting overview of the journal’s
eclecticism and at the same time, a fairly clear idea of the structure and
relationships between the great debates that have taken place in China
since the end of the Cold War. 
Lastly, we will try to see where these polemics have led by observing the
contemporary intellectual scene, for does not the beginning of the twenty-
first century correspond to a form of normalisation that focuses on several
essential ideas emanating from the many post-1989 crises? 
Jin and Liu, the young guard of cultural
activists
At the origin of the Ershiyi shiji adventure we find a couple of intellectu-
als: Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. (7) Born with the People’s Republic, they
were prevented from attending university during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976) and are part of the loose group of intellectuals who consider
that rather than having broken away from pre-1949 China, the “New
China” is simply the last stage in a long historic process in which the harm-
ful and alienating influence of a traditional holistic ideology persists. They
see in the rigid dogma of Marxism a renewed version of a Confucianist
rigour they deem “feudal” (封建). (8) It was for this hypothesis of the stabil-
ity of the ideological structures of traditional Chinese society that from the
beginning of the 1980s, Jin and Liu were to become known. (9) A scientist
by training, Jin Guantao supported his argument with the vocabulary of
theories in vogue at the time, (10) which gave his articles a modern and sci-
entific aura that was poles apart from the revolutionary romanticism of
the previous decades. In this way he succeeded in publishing a work that
bypassed the conventions of traditional Marxist historiography and alien-
ated itself from the sycophancy of orthodox historiography, the exclusive
and beloved preserve of the Party. (11) Although the distribution of Jin
Guantao and Liu Qingfeng’s first publications remained confined to a nar-
row readership, once their essay Xingsheng yu Weiji (興盛與危機 – Crisis
6. For an example of Xu Youyu’s work, see “The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Concealed History and To-
be-discovered Memory,” in History and Memory: Present Reflections to Build Our Future, Macau,
Mateo Ricci Institute, 2008, pp. 447-60.
7. Liu Qingfeng tells of her meeting with Jin Guantao in a novel, which takes the form of an exchange of
letters between friends and shows the confusion of a generation faced with the state of their country
and their hopes for change. Jin Fan (Liu’s pen-name), “Gongkai de qingshu” (Open love letters), original
1972 manuscript version, published in Women (We) a non-official paper in Hangzhou. Published later
in Shiyue (October) in 1980, then again in Shiyue wenxue congshu (October’s literary collection), Bei-
jing, Beijing chubanshe, 1981. The novel is available on the Internet (http://www.shuku.net:8082/nov-
els/dangdai/ publicqingshu/publicqingshu.html) (29/11/2009). The novel created a wave of intense
emotion well before scar literature (shanghen wenxue); see: Tan Mei, “Nianqing yi dai de renshengjia –
‘Gongkai de qingshu’  yinqi de zhenglun” (A young humanist generation: the polemic surrounding
“Open Love Letters”), Zhengming, no. 34, Hong Kong, August 1980. Liu Qingfeng refers to this episode
in an interview given to Shanghai Culture, the journal of the Institute of Literature of the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences, no. 74, vol. 3, 2009, pp. 96-101.
8. Jin Guantao gives an account of his intellectual awakening in a biography, Wode zhexue tansuo (My
philosophic exploration), Shanghai, People’s Press, 1988; it was then published in Taipei, Fengyun
Shidai, 1989, and lastly in Beijing by New Star Publishing, 2005, under the title Xitong de Zhexue (Phi-
losophy of systems). 
9. Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, “Zhongguo fengjian shehui de jiegou – Yige chaowending xitong” (Struc-
ture of feudal Chinese society: A hyperstable system), Guiyang shifan daxue wenxuebao, vol. 1, no. 2,
1979. The article became an essay five years later, Xingsheng yu Weiji – lun Zhongguo fengjian shehui
de chaowending jiegou (Crisis and Prosperity: The hyperstability of the structures of feudal Chinese so-
ciety), Changsha, Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1984. The essay has been regularly republished since in
Taiwan and Hong Kong. It is worth noting that after 20 years of being banned, this first essay and other
writings by Jin and Liu were once again published in the PRC by Falü chubanshe (Law Publisher) in Bei-
jing.
10. Cybernetics, set theory and systems analysis have since, in China as elsewhere, fallen into disuse. They
are known in China under the term “three old theories,” laosanlun.
11. Although the hypotheses of Jin Guantao have been widely criticised from an academic point of view,
one might question whether their interest was merely academic. See: Ye Xiaoqing, “Patriotism
versus Intellectual Curiosity: Jin Guantao’s Approach to Chinese History,” in Gloria Davies, Voicing Con-
cerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp. 185-98. 
Ershiyi Shiji celebrates its 20th
anniversary, October 2010.
Jin Guantao and his wife, Liu Qingfeng.
© Liu Qingfeng
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and Prosperity) was published in 1984, the split between reformists and
conservatives was from then on clearly defined. Published at the cross-
roads of a publishing market in its infancy and the expectations of a curi-
ous public, the book, keen to respond to the reforming impulse set in mo-
tion by the highest authorities, was a success. (12)
Institutional support and collaborators 
To ensure the publication of this essay under conditions that suited them,
Jin and Liu, with the active complicity of the historian Bao Zunxin 
(包遵信 1937-2007), were behind an attempt at fostering an autonomous
civil society that was unique in the history of the People’s Republic: the
founding of the book series “Towards the Future” (走向未來叢書 – Zou xiang
weilai congshu). It was a fertile breeding-ground. Those born after 1949 had
grown up in a highly dogmatic, culturally arid world, a world that some
even considered relatively boring. (13) The number of publications fell from
27,000 in 1957 to 600 in 1967. In 1957 there were 600 periodicals; only 20
remained in 1967. (14) In the gradual opening-up of the country after 1978,
the failure of the Chinese Communist scheme became clear in the light of
Western opulence, although the latter had already been affected by eco-
nomic crisis. Young people were eager for new ideas to solve the country’s
problems. At the same time, the economy was slowly emerging from the
rigidity of the Plan. As part of the same movement, the embryonic publish-
ing market benefited from the support of middle-ranking bureaucrats who
had confidence in the young guard of cultural activists. These cadres were
apparatchiks, directors of academic institutions, directors of research insti-
tutes, and editors of official papers. They were often close to the reform
movement of Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽 1919-2005) and were open-minded
enough to feel that Chinese society needed to develop. Yu Guangyuan (于
光遠 born in 1915) was amongst them. A student in physics who joined the
Party in 1935, hero of the anti-Japanese resistance, and a translator of En-
gels, in 1949 he became head of the scientific section of the Department
of Propaganda, and Party secretary of the Philosophy and Social Sciences
Division of the Academy of Sciences. When the Division expanded in No-
vember 1977, becoming the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中國社會
科學院 – Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan), he was appointed Vice-President.
That same year, together with several colleagues, he decided to relaunch
the Journal of Dialectics of Nature (自然辯證法通訊 – Ziran bianzhengfa
tongxun), a newsletter originally specialising in the philosophy of sciences,
the publication of which had been interrupted during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. The journal’s editor-in-chief, Li Baoheng (李保恆 born in 1922), then
decided to hire Jin Guantao – a young physics and chemistry teacher at the
time – to work on this national paper. Very quickly, the Journal exceeded its
initial ambition. By taking an interest in all scientific innovation, it began to
attract many young talents in an atmosphere of freedom that prefigured
the 1980s. These young 30-year-old intellectuals used the Journal of Dialec-
tics of Nature as a first staging-post in the publication of their new opti-
mistic, scientific, and rational ideals. (15) However, the marked heterodoxy of
their work soon incited them to found their own paper. 
“Towards the future”
With the complicity of a group of reformist cadres in sympathy with the
optimistic energy of the young couple, and after several abortive attempts
to create a journal, Jin, Liu, and Bao finally managed to create an adminis-
trative framework at the limits of socialist legality that enabled them to
found a series of books and retain complete control of its content and ed-
itorial line. (16) To publish a series of books without the control of the Party,
in a country that had barely emerged from one of the twentieth century’s
strictest totalitarian regimes, was an unique success that was to serve as a
model for the “book series craze” (業書熱 – congshure) that was to feed the
many debates on Chinese culture in the second half of the 1980s. In 1984,
when the first series of books in the “Towards the Future” collection was
published, the debates between the reformers led by Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦
1915-1989) and then Zhao Ziyang, and the conservative old guard led by
“the immortal” Chen Yun (陳雲 1905-1995), took on a different aspect. The
division had been clearly established and was to leave its mark on the end
of the decade. The response to the translated works and essays of the
young 30-year-old intellectuals aroused people’s curiosity and stuck in
their minds. (17) The Sichuan People’s Press reprinted the works continu-
ously. (18)
The Future group is generally associated with two other groups of intel-
lectuals: firstly, “Culture: China and the World” (文化：中國輿世界 – Wen-
hua: Zhongguo yu shijie), founded by Gan Yang (甘陽 born in 1952), and
secondly, the “Academy of Chinese Culture” (中國文化書院 – Zhongguo
wenhua shuyuan), an institute that offers seminars and lessons directed in
particular towards the renewal and the spreading of national studies (國學
– guoxue) (19) and associated with the guardian figure of Liang Shuming 
(梁漱溟 1893-1988). Without going into detail, it must be said that the Fu-
turologists stood out as much by virtue of the wide range of subjects they
tackled as by their avowed ambition to make their publications accessible
to as many people as possible. (20) This high-quality “popularisation” ap-
proach, the aim of which is to educate as many people as possible, has
been a constant thread in Jin Guantao’s career. 
Exile in Hong Kong 
In 1987, at the height of their fame, the couple was invited to Hong Kong
for the first time by Chen Fangzheng, Director of the Institute of Chinese
12. Chen Yan, L’éveil de la Chine (The Awakening of China), La tour d’Aigues, éditions de l’Aube, 2002, p.
89.
13. For boredom amongst a certain section of Chinese youth in the1970s, see the memoires of the writer
Yu Hua in La Chine en dix mots (China in ten words), Paris, Actes Sud, 2010. For someone who was a
young adolescent at the time and unaware of what was at stake, “wrestling matches” and fights re-
lieved a daily life described as very dull. 
14. Jin Guantao and Chen Fangzheng (Chen Fong-ching), From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy, Hong
Kong, CUHK Press, 1997, p. 126.
15. To gain an idea of the first publications, see Jin Guantao, Fan Hongye, and Liu Qingfeng, “Kexue jishu
jiegou de lishi bianqian – lun shiqi shiji hou zhongguo kexue jishu luohou yu xifang de yuanyin” (His-
torical development of the scientific and technical framework: Discussion on the reasons why China
lagged behind the West in terms of technology after the 17th century), Journal de la dialectique de la
nature, no. 5, Beijing, 1982. An English version of this article can be found in Fan Dainian and Robert
S. Cohan (ed.), “Chinese Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology,” Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 179, Dordrecht, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
16. All the details of the administrative structure can be found in Jin Guantao’s only book published in Eng-
lish and co-written with one of the key players in the founding of Ershiyi shiji. Jin Guantao and Chen
Fangzheng, opus cit. On the role of Bao Zunxin and his gradual eviction, ibid., pp. 114 and 209. 
17. Translations of Douglas Hofstadter, Fritjof Capra, and Max Weber appeared, to name but three. All the
titles published in the collection can be found in Edward X. Gu, “Cultural Intellectuals and the Politics
of the Cultural Public Space in Communist China (1979-1989): A Case Study of Three Intellectual
Groups,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 58, no. 2, 1999, pp. 404-406.
18. Chen Yan, op. cit., pp. 86-97. 
19. China Perspectives devoted issue number 2011/1 to the renewal of national studies. 
20. Michel Bonnin and Yves Chevrier, “The Intellectual and the State: Social Dynamics of Intellectual Au-
tonomy during the Post-Mao Era,” The China Quarterly, no. 127, September 1991, pp. 569-593. 
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Studies (ICS). In 1986, Chen had taken over the reins of the Institute
(founded in 1967) with “the firm intention of modernising an institution that
was gently ticking over with the traditional Chinese activities of the time: ar-
chaeology, literature, translation of the classics, and divinatory inscrip-
tions.” (21) He then travelled frequently with the aim of extending the visibil-
ity of the Institute worldwide. He returned to Harvard, of which he was a
graduate, and met the historians Ezra F. Vogel (傅高義 born in 1930), John K.
Fairbank (費正清 1907-1991), and the philosopher Yu Yingshi (余英時 born in
1930). By inviting Jin Guantao and his wife, he was attempting to open the
Institute up to a mainland China undergoing an intellectual reawakening. 
Far removed from the already considerable radicalisation of the younger
generations, Jin and Liu and their contacts, who were very familiar with
the workings of the Party-State, still believed at the time that reform
could only come from within the system itself. They remained convinced
that the system could be modified from the inside and that they would
drive the country forward. Contrary to the countries of Eastern Europe, the
public arena was not seen as a place in which to break free from the au-
thority of the state, but to reform it. This was a Chinese particularity that
led certain observers to consider as inevitable the failure of all future at-
tempts at institutionalising civil society based on the Habermassian
model, outside the machinery of state and extraneous to its power struc-
tures. (22) Invited again for a period of six months, Jin Guantao and Liu
Qingfeng arrived in Hong Kong in April 1989, just a few days before the
death of Hu Yaobang. They returned to China to participate, in an ex-
tremely tense atmosphere, in a conference at Wofosi, at the gates of Bei-
jing, for the 70th anniversary of May Fourth 1919, but it was in Hong
Kong that they would live through the dramatic events of June Fourth. (23)
After Chen Xitong (陳希同 born in 1930), then Mayor of Beijing, accused
them of being amongst the “black hands” of the 1989 democratic move-
ment, it rapidly became clear that it would not be possible for them to re-
turn in the near future. (24)
In December 1989, the agitation created by the role of Hong Kong in the
evacuation of dissidents finally calmed down, but for Jin, Liu, and Chen, in
this return to routine, one question remained: what was to be done to pre-
vent the decade’s humanist upswell and the undisputed intellectual im-
pulse that accompanied it from disappearing? Together with Ambrose King
(金耀基 – Jin Yaoji, born in 1935), a Taiwanese sociologist, the decision was
taken to create a journal. To consolidate the academic foundation of the
project, the four decided to appeal to the Chinese intellectual diaspora, in
a supranational movement that prefigured the opening up of the Chinese
world to its academic margins and in particular, Anglo-Saxon academia. (25)
Thanks to the celebrity of the players they recruited, funds were quickly
amassed. The technical difficulties linked to creating a journal were also
quickly resolved. So on 27 October 1990, a journal appeared that opened
with the catch phrase: “For the cultural construction of China” (為了中國的
文化建設 – Weile Zhongguo de wenhua jianshe), (26) a slogan that served as
a title for Chen Fangzheng’s editorial. 
21. Interview with Chen Fangzheng, 19 November 2010, Hong Kong. 
22. Laurence Weerts, “Quatre modèles théoriques pour penser la société civile dans l’ordre juridique inter-
national” (Four theoretical models for understanding civil society under international law), Report pre-
sented to the closed seminar Société civile et démocratisation des organisations internationales, 28
and 29 May 2004 at the free university of Brussels, p. 29 of the Internet version
(http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/fichiers/modeles_theoriques.pdf). See also: Michael B. Frolic, “State-
Led Civil Society,” in Timothy Brook and Michael B. Frolic (ed.), Civil Society in China, New York, M.E.
Sharpe, 1997, p. 51. On the absence of an autonomous “buffer” between the state and society and its
replacement in China by an “authority principle” in place of a public sphere, see Yves Chevrier, “L’his-
torien politique et la Chine: Quelques réflexions” (The political historian and China: Some thoughts,”
Journal des anthropologues, no. 92-93, 2003, pp. 6 sq. (of the electronic version). 
23. Jin Guantao and Chen Fangzheng, op. cit., pp. 259-69. 
24. Chen Yingxiang, Dégel de l’intelligence en Chine 1976-1989 (Thaw of intelligence in China 1976-1989)
Collection Témoins, Paris, Gallimard, 2004, p. 346. Chen Xitong was expelled from the Party in 1997
and was sentenced to 16 years in prison for corruption in 1998.
25. Du Weiming, op. cit.
26. Chen Fangzheng (ed.), Yu Zhongda yitong chengzhang (Growing up with CUHK), Hong Kong, CUHK
Press, 1998, p. 117. 
“For the cultural construction of
China,” cover of the first issue of
Ershiyi Shiji, October 1990.
The staff and some editorial board members of 21st Century at its inauguration
on 27 October 1990: Liu Qingfeng (front row), Chen Fangzheng (front row second
from left), and Jin Guantao (back row, second from right). © Chen Fangzheng
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The 1990s according to Xu Youyu
To try to visualise the way in which the intellectual landscape was recon-
figured and to gain a clear understanding of the close parallels between
the journal and the Chinese world at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, let us go back in time a little with the Beijing philosopher and histo-
rian Xu Youyu to what he considered to be the five major elements of the
intellectual restructuring that followed the double trauma in 1989 of the
repression in Tiananmen Square and the end of the Cold War following the
collapse of the Communist bloc. (27) Xu Youyu, in the few pages he devotes
to the twentieth anniversary of the journal, draws up a five-point table
that seems to us significant, coming as it does from a well-known player
on the intellectual stage, appreciated for his rigour and the constancy of
his commitment. (28)
(1) Firstly, immediately following the 1980s and the repression of the
student movement, intellectuals examined with hindsight their own vac-
illations between radicalism and conservatism, between their passion for
“the spirit of May Fourth” (五四運動精神 – wusi yundong jingshen) and
their fear of “troubles” (動亂 – dongluan). In the pages of Ershiyi shiji,
starting with its second issue (December 1990), a change of direction oc-
curred condemning the radicalism of the 1980s as heir to the same atti-
tude that pushed the first modern radicals to embrace Marxism-Lenin-
ism rather than the liberal pragmatism defended by Hu Shi (胡適 1891-
1962) at the same time. For the Sino-American historian Yu Yingshi, the
twentieth century was the “most sombre” period in the history of the
Chinese nation. The condemnation of Communism was categorical. In
the same issue, Du Weiming (杜維明, born in 1940) raised the question of
the responsibility of those intellectuals who by allowing traditional cul-
ture and society to disappear have placed themselves on the sidelines of
the body politic. (29) For the authors of Ershiyi shiji, after the thirst for
freedom expressed in a sometimes rather chaotic manner over the pre-
ceding decade, it was time to revert to an attitude of greater pragmatic
realism towards conditions in China, whilst at the same time reinforcing
the move towards the professionalisation of the academic world begun
in the PRC towards the end of the 1980s. (30) In the same issue, Jin Guan-
tao reiterated this view in his analysis of the place occupied by utopia (
烏托邦 – wutuobang) in Chinese culture. He added a subtle, yet signifi-
cant qualifier, however: in his view, utopia was maintained in China by a
type of political pan-moralism, which from the Great Unity (大同 – Da-
tong) to the “benevolent government” (仁政 – renzheng), propelled the
Chinese into the catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution. (31) Jin Guantao is part – as we have seen – of an intellectual
movement that regularly analyses the China of today in the mirror of
history and tries to throw light on the structural links that may exist be-
tween past and present. (32)
(2) It very soon became clear to the authors of the journal that nation-
alism and its political instrumentalisation had become the only ideolog-
ical horizon the government could rely on. From 1992 onwards, there-
fore, the journal took an interest in the building up, development, and
use of modern nationalism. The ICS organised an international confer-
ence on the theme of “Nationalism and Modernisation in China,” pub-
lishing most of the speeches in two special issues of Ershiyi shiji (no. 15
and 16, February and April 1993). (33) The question of nationalism re-
mained, moreover, a central issue for the journal that was the first to
publish, as early as 1993, the translation of a famous article by Samuel
Huntington. Over and above a hypothetical “clash of civilisations,” the
article foreshadowed the present day and the appearance of a paradoxi-
cal tension between a progressive opening up to the world and the eth-
nocultural assertion of identity characteristic of contemporary soci-
eties. (34) It was a time when China’s relations with the rest of the world
were very tentatively becoming normalised as a result of a difficult,
often polemical examination of the relationship between the Chinese
and the Western “Other.” Within the criticisms of the intellectual arsenal
of Western modernity – essentially the product of eighteenth and nine-
teenth century Europe – a qualitative change in critical thinking was at
work. “Liberalism,” “constitutionalism,” and “democracy,” as well as
“Marxism,” “socialism,” and “tradition”; all the categories of the twenti-
eth century were reviewed and reinterpreted in the light of a modernity
that was now seen as truly Chinese. In this decisive movement, they
were the object of a major semantic shift that allowed them to move
from Chinese characteristics (中國特色 – Zhongguo tese) of foreign ideas
to an autonomous, independent, and indigenous Chinese model (中國模
式 – Zhongguo moshi). (35)
(3) The development of the rhetoric of nationalist arguments itself be-
came indissociable from another movement that was seeking, at first
through literary criticism, to deconstruct the presuppositions and unspo-
ken issues of the debates of the 1980s. The journal initiated the polemics
and quarrels that were to mark the intellectual community in China after
1989. Positions on these questions of language clearly stemmed from
clashes between the old guard of intellectual liberals, educated in ideals of
freedom and progress and active during the 1980s, and a new generation
of intellectuals and writers who not only had no links to the Chinese “En-
lightenment” (啟蒙運動 – Qimeng yundong), but quite simply ignored or
even openly (and vigorously) condemned it. 
27. Xu Youyu, “Women xuyao zhege sixiang wenhua kongjian” (We need this cultural space for thought),
Ershiyi shiji, no. 121, Hong Kong, pp. 42-43. 
28. See also the speech made on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the events of 1989, which appeared
in the web review Rue89: http://www.rue89.com/2009/06/04/1989-2009-les-heritiers-de-tianan-
men-reclament-la-democratie?page=0#comment-895417 (04/08/2011). 
29. Yu Ying-shih, “Daicongtou, shouhe jiushanhe” (Picking up the pieces for a new start), Ershiyi shiji, no. 2,
December 1990, and “Zhongguo zhishifenzi de bianyuanhua” (The marginalisation of Chinese intellec-
tuals), Ershiyi shiji, no. 8, December 1991. Du Weiming, “Huajie qimeng xingtai” (Going beyond enlight-
enment syndrome), Ershiyi shiji, no. 2, December1990. 
30. Xu Jilin, “Qimeng de mingyun” (The destiny of enlightenment), Ershiyi shiji, no. 50, December 1998. 
31. The article “Zhongguo wenhua de wutuobang jingshen” (The utopic spirit of Chinese culture) was re-
published in Jin Guantao and Liu Qinfeng, “Mao Zedong sixiang yu ruxue” (Maoist thought and Con-
fucianism), Taipei, Fengyun sichao, 2006, pp. 37-58. 
32. In the same review (see preceding note), the same authors have written an article that is emblematic
of this movement, and was first published in 1988: “Zhongguoshi de shehuizhuyi yu chuantong – lun
Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhi wenhua de xingcheng he fazhan” (Chinese Socialism and tradition: On the
formation and development of modern Chinese political culture), pp. 21-37. 
33. The proceedings of the conference were published soon after: Liu Qingfeng (ed.), Minzuzhuyi yu
Zhongguo xiandaihua, Hong Kong, CUHK Press, 1994.
34. Samuel Huntington’s article “Wenming de chongtu?” (The clash of civilisations?), published in Ershiyi
shiji, (no. 19, October 1993), is symptomatic of this tension between globalisation and nationalism.
The article, published first in English in Foreign Affairs in 1993, had already attracted fierce polemics. 
35. It would not be possible to go into all the details of these many subjects. One can, however, consult
the journal’s highly efficient index on its Internet website: http://www.ics.cuhk.edu.hk/
rcccc/21c/index/ (27/05/2011). For a more general overview of this movement, see Tao Dongfeng,
“Cong huhuan xiandaihua dao fansi xiandaixing” (From the call to modernisation to reflections on
modernity), Ershiyi shiji, no. 53, June 1999, pp. 15-23. No. 121 of October 2010 devotes an entire fea-
ture to it entitled “Reflections on the Chinese model.” 
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Dismayed by the success of popular writers – of whom Wang Shuo (王朔
born in 1958) is an illustrious example (36) – these liberal intellectuals raged
against the new mass culture, source of materialistic alienation that trans-
mits the cultural “hooliganism” (流氓文化 – liumang wenhua) of lacklustre
literary heroes with no ideals, created by authors who openly declared
their financial ambitions in an expressly cynical stance. These writers seem
poles apart from the disinterested humanist spirit (人文精神 – renwen jing-
shen) defended by advocates of a more fundamentally positive litera-
ture. (37) On the other hand, the writer Wang Meng (王蒙 born in 1934), for-
mer minister of culture and figurehead of the intellectual opening-up of
the 1980s, defended mass culture, in which he saw the very expression of
the modernity so keenly sought in the 1980s. (38) For leftist critics, however,
the condemnation was categorical, since:
Intellectuals lament the priority of money, moral corruption, and
the loss of social order in a commercialised society [on the one
hand, but they] cannot avoid acknowledging that they are situated
in this very process of modernisation – as commercialisation – that
was formerly their goal. (39)
And these polemics on the amoral values of popular culture, the aims of
literature, and the ultimate concerns (終極關懷 – zhongji guanhuai) of the
intellectual community were quite naturally transformed into an examina-
tion of the presuppositions of the language in which the debate was de-
veloping and of the ideological weight of what it left unsaid. So between
the launch of the journal and the mid-1990s, from issue to issue, a new
way of seeing, thinking, and talking about China was created.
One might perhaps date the coming to maturity of the rhetorical uses of
postmodern and postcolonial theories in the pages of the journal – and on
the Chinese scene in general – from the reactions provoked by a special
issue of the journal Modern China dated January 1993. (40) This provided an
opportunity for a new generation of intellectuals, academics versed in the
practice of literary criticism, to challenge the fundamentals of their pred-
ecessors’ ideals. By highlighting the negative view of the ideals of progress
and modernity in the writings of Michel Foucault (褔柯 – Fuke, 1926-1924)
and other fashionable thinkers, the new generation of intellectuals made
these writings lose the critical force they had held in the 1980s against the
discourse of power. (41) However, this erosion of resistance carried within it
an ambiguity that gave birth to two new trends: on the one hand, the crit-
ical stance permitted in China by knowledge of imported theories was a
strategic means of holding power at a distance, (42) and on the other, a cer-
tain degree of rallying took place to the views of political authorities who
had succeeded in brilliantly co-opting this intellectual renewal to nourish
the theoretical poverty of the official national discourse. (43) The arrival of
“postisms” (後學 – houxue) in the debate was to extensively occupy the
pages of Ershiyi shiji in the mid-1990s. (44)
There was, for example, the critic Zhang Yiwu (張頤武 born in 1963) from
Beijing, who condemned the contemporary anxiety engendered by the loss
of the humanist spirit of the preceding period as elitist resistance to mass
culture, a resistance that in his opinion remained blind to the democratic
potential of popular culture. (45) The verdict was all the more severe since
he at the same time attacked the iconoclastic heritage of 4 May 1919,
upon which colonial and pro-Western literature had been built, and which
for him was characteristic of Chinese culture in the period 1920-80. (46)
Other authors of the same period seem nonetheless to understand very
clearly the link between postisms, cultural studies, and state nationalism in
third world countries. They warned against the instrumentalisation of the
emotional moment linked to the idea of Nation and its potentially explo-
sive populist exploitation. (47)
So as we can see, imported textuality had, in the Chinese debate, broken
free of its original literary and aesthetic links to enrich the field of history
and politics. (48) It was an opening-up of the Chinese world that rather par-
adoxically corresponded in the People’s Republic with a turn away from
the new national narrative, made possible by the immense success of
translations of the classics of postcolonial literature. (49) It might be said
that reading – sometimes rather hastily – Edward Said’s classic had a con-
siderable effect on the universities of the former colonies. (50) Young Chi-
nese intellectuals rushed into this breach. The liberating effect of this new
subjectivity, introduced by a theoretical enrichment, against the Western
demand for objectivity resulted in the elimination of one of the poles of
the China/West binarism, or at least, put it into perspective. However, this
challenge to Western cultural hegemony necessarily led to a problematic
examination of Chinese cultural subjectivity that was all the more complex
since it could easily be appropriated by narrow nationalistic arguments. (51)
The links between this triple phenomenon – mass culture, “post” theo-
ries, and globalisation/nationalism tension – has proved fundamental for
understanding how the Chinese intellectual landscape was redrawn after
36. Wang Shuo, Please Don’t Call Me Human (Qianwan bie ba wo dang ren), London, No Exit Press, 2000
(trans. Howard Goldblatt – first edition in Chinese: 1989).
37. See for example, Chen Pingyuan, “Jinbainian Zhongguo jingshen wenhua de shiluo” (The decline of the
elite culture in China in the last century), Ershiyi shiji, no. 17, June 1993.
38. Wang Meng, “Duobi zonggao” (Fleeing the sublime), Dushu, January 1993. Available online at:
http://reading.cersp.com/WeekReading/Extended/200603/1137.html (6/10/2010).
39. Wang Hui, “Dangdai Zhongguo sixiang zhuangkuang yu xiandaixing de weiji” (State of contemporary
Chinese thought and the modernity crisis of modernity), quoted by Gloria Davies, Worrying About
China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 63. 
40. “Symposium: Ideology and Theory in the Study of Modern Chinese Literature: Paradigmatic Issue in
Chinese Studies,” Modern China, vol. 19, no. 1, January 1993. 
41. Xu Ben, Disenchanted Democracy: Chinese Cultural Criticism After 1989, Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1999. See in particular Chapter 3: “The Postmodern-Postcolonial Stimulus and the Rise
of Chinese Post-ist Theory,” pp. 88 sq. 
42. Gloria Davies, Worrying about China, op. cit., p. 116.
43. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004.
44. It was Zhao Yiheng who first coined the term Houxue, “Post studies,” “post-isms,” and “postology,” in
an article published in no. 27 of Ershiyi shiji (February 1995): “Houxue yu Zhongguo xin baoshouzhuyi”
(Postology and new conservatism in China). The term covers rather well, and not without a pinch of
humour, postcolonial and postmodern discourse as well as deconstruction and debates on post-social-
ism, the post “New era,” and post-totalitarianism. The term has been handed down to us and can now
be said to have entered everyday speech. 
45. Zhang Yiwu, “Chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolü” (The anxiety of interpreting China), Ershiyi shiji, no. 28, April
1995. 
46. Edward L. Davis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp.
482-3.
47. For example: Xu Ben, in “Disanshijie piping zai dangdai zhongguo de chujing” (State of Third-World crit-
icism in China today), Ershiyi shiji, no. 27, February 1995.
48. An Asian counterpart to François Cusset’s classic (French Theory, La Découverte, 2003) that would give
an account of the impact of literary, philosophical, and social theories on the Chinese intellectual and
political world has yet to be written. It is a journey that would take us from the innovative experiences
of Yue Daiyun, starting in 1980, to the translations of Fredric Jameson’s lectures of 1985-86 by Tang
Xiaobing and Zhang Xudong, future pupil and disciple of Arif Dirlik, specialist in the history of the Com-
munist movement and an informed connoisseur of Chinese postisms. Yue Dayun’s “On Western Liter-
ary Theory in China” can be found in Gloria Davis, op. cit., 2001, pp. 109-23. 
49. Zhang Yinde, “Orient-Extrême: la réinterprétation en Chine des théories postcoloniales” (Far East: The
reinterpretations in China of postcolonial theories), Revue de littérature comparée, Paris, éditions
Klincksieck, no. 297, 2001/1. 
50. The unabridged version of Orientalism (Vintage Books, 1978; Seuil, 1978) was not translated in its en-
tirety into Chinese under the title Dongfangxue until 1999, published by Sanlian shudian, Beijing.
51. Xu Ben, Disenchanted Democracy, op. cit., Chapter 4, “The Anxiety of Cross Cultural Theorizing,” pp.
129 sq. 
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the traumas of 1989 around sometimes irreconcilable positions, challeng-
ing Marxist and Confucian ideological heritage just as much as the “pro-
Western” liberal opinions of the 1980s. It was in this new language that the
players of the New Left, the defenders of liberalism, and contemporary
promoters of revived Confucianism expressed themselves. These three
events – contemporary, interwoven, and permeable – dramatically trans-
formed the nature and language of Chinese studies, enriching debates with
a theoretical textuality that was by and large imported and relayed
through the pages of Ershiyi shiji. 
It must be added here that the impact of the market and Capitalist glob-
alisation, which provided a new backdrop to these ruptures, was no less a
revolution. This decisive change gave birth not only to cultural relativism, the
direct consequence of pragmatic and instrumental readings of the classics of
the postcolonial canon, (52) but also to new, ambiguous forms of resistance,
sometimes difficult to interpret in a process of clarifying an often ambiguous
link with the West that is now finally removing China and the Chinese from
its oscillation between the attraction and repulsion created by the hopes and
frustrations born of the meeting with its cultural “Other.” (53)
(4) Parallel to these developments, the journal also kept an eye on the
economic and social developments that triggered the wave of economic
liberation brought about in 1992 by Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平 1904-1997)
now famous Southern Inspection Tour (南巡 Nanxun). Most critics – econ-
omists, sociologists, and historians – discussed with particular passion the
new social polarisation engendered in Chinese society by the reforms. This
became evident in the late 1990s and gathered steam in the 2000s, to the
point where it became the heart of social policy from 2002 onwards with
the “small prosperity” (小康 – xiao kang) and “harmonious society” (和諧
社會 – hexie shehui) projects. (54) The criticisms of the Ershiyi shiji authors
with regard to these new concepts were severe. In particular there are the
uncompromising observations of He Qinglian (何清漣 born in 1956) on
the moral responsibility and social cost of the reforms, whether it be a
question of the Chinese stock markets, (55) ownership rights, corruption, (56)
or the financial crisis. (57) One also thinks of the solutions that political sci-
entists and economists as different as Wang Shaoguang (王紹光 born in
1954), Hu Angang (胡鞍鋼 born in 1953), and Cui Zhiyuan (崔之元 born in
1963) tried to provide for these problems in a special feature in the jour-
nal devoted to the debate on the “government’s capacities” (國家能力 –
guojia nengli). (58)
(5) Lastly, Xu Youyu reminds us that Ershiyi shiji is the only journal pub-
lished in China in which the memory of the traumatic events of the Cul-
tural Revolution (1966-76) is regularly the subject of articles, special fea-
tures, and anniversary issues. (59) The former Red Guard knows what he is
talking about when he says that: 
The particular value of Ershiyi shiji lies in the fact that if China needs
a forum for debate, when the intellectual community has no other
choice than to create this arena elsewhere, the journal of the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong is there. It has offered those who think
about China a precious arena in which to faithfully record the tortu-
ous path of the world of Chinese thinking over the last 20 years. (60)
Finally, one might add that the very existence of this journal, and the
metronomic regularity of its publication, invalidates somewhat the com-
mon perception of a rupture between the years 1980 and 1990. Indeed,
one might consider that Ershiyi shiji is prolonging the most positive as-
pects of the spirit of the Chinese Enlightenment of the 1980s. (61) Its core
value of intellectual diversity, the pluridisciplinary rigour of its content, and
its desire to remain accessible to the greatest number of readers would
seem to be an extension of the professionalisation movement begun in the
late 1980s by mainland cultural activists. The latter had quickly under-
stood that the intellectual dispersion characteristic of the period they had
just lived through was not only of little constructive value, but above all
potentially dangerous for any edifice constructed since the end of the
1970s. Ershiyi shiji therefore proved that a somewhat erratic period of
nalaizhuyi (拿來主義 – “raptism”) may be succeeded (from Hong Kong) in
exemplary fashion by a journal that embodies rigour, curiosity, openness,
and pluralism. (62)
The 2000s – Normalisation of the
intellectual world?
The current prospect of a certain degree of stability in the Chinese intel-
lectual scene is the direct result of the period of crisis in meanings we have
just discussed. It is certainly now possible to speak of a form of normalisa-
tion of the intellectual exchanges resulting from this intense restructuring, in
the 1990s, of a vast number of crisis situations (postmodernity, postsocial-
ism, post “New Era,” etc.). Progressively, the positions and trends became
clear, and a new consensus emerged in the 2000s based on three new para-
digms, recently analysed in detail by anthropologist Joël Thoraval. (63)
Firstly, the return of Confucianism in intellectual and political debates is
now inevitable. The range of opinions on this question is extremely vast,
however, ranging from the vision of Tang Yijie (湯一介 born in 1927), pro-
moter of a low-key, modern, and potentially democratic doctrine, via that
of Zhao Tingyang (趙汀陽 born in 1961), who would like to demonstrate
52. Zhou Xingjie, “Jinshinian Zhongguo houzhiminzhuyi piping zongshu” (Outline of postcolonial critique
in the last ten years), Journal of the University of Yanshan, Xiangtan, vol. 4, no. 1, 2003. 
53. On this point, besides Chen Yan’s work (note 12), and Wang Chaohua’s introduction, “Mind of the
Nineties” (in Wang Chaohua (ed.), One China, Many Paths, London, Verso, 2003) that retraces the de-
velopment of this major rupture of the 1990s, quoting freely from articles that appeared in the Hong
Kong journal, one could, for a more detailed view, read Liu Kang’s little book, Globalization and Cultural
Trends in China, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2004, or the classic by Arlif Dirlik and Zhang
Xudong (eds.), Postmodernism and China, London, Duke University Press, 2000. On the language of
Chinese intellectuals and its subtleties, see Gloria Davies, Worrying About China: The Language of Chi-
nese Critical Enquiry, op. cit. 
54. “Creating a harmonious society,” special issue of China Perspectives, no. 2007/3. 
55. Ershiyi shiji, no. 21, February 1994.
56. Ershiyi shiji, no. 29, June 1995.
57. Ershiyi shiji, no. 44, December 1997. Following the publication of her book Xiandaihua de xianjing (The
trap of modernisation) (Jinri Zhongguo, 1998), He Qinglian was forced to leave China. She now lives
in the United States. 
58. Ershiyi shiji, no. 21, February1994.
59. Anniversary numbers, no. 36 and no. 37, August and September 1996, and no. 93, February 2006. 
60. Xu Youyu, “Women xuyao zhege sixiang wenhua kongjian,” art. cit. (note 27), p. 42. 
61. Liu Qingfeng sees a more pragmatic continuity in the turnaround of certain activists after 1989. See:
Liu Qingfeng, “Topography of Intellectual Culture in the 1990s: A Survey,” in Gloria Davies, op. cit.,
2001, pp. 47-69.
62. Nalaizhuyi is a principle (zhuyi) of appropriation (nalai) of foreign ideas with the sole aim of improving
the Chinese situation. The term was invented by Lu Xun in 1934. There are several English translations:
“raptism,” “appropriatism,” and “take-ism,” among others. In French, the neologism “empruntisme”
seems to fit quite well. 
63. During a conference organised for the publication of no. 31 of the journal Extrême Orient/Extrême Oc-
cident, on 17 February 2010 at EHESS in Paris and available online at: http://www.rap.prd.fr/
ressources/detailVideo.php?fichier=ehess/cecmc/regard_sur_le_politique_en_chine.rm (19/05/2011). 
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that the concept of Tianxia (天下 – everything under heaven) is the future
of international relations, to the extremism of Jiang Qing (將慶 born in
1953), in favour of an antimodern, antidemocratic, and anti-Western tra-
ditionalism together with a utopic Royal Path (王道 – Wangdao) forged in
a sublimated past. (64)
Secondly, ever since the challenges to the very idea of modernity – by
Wang Hui (汪暉 born in 1959), Gan Yang, and Liu Xiaofeng (劉小楓 born in
1956) among others – we have been witnessing a widening of the histor-
ical perspective with the appearance of a new sense of the relationship to
history, doubtless made possible by a little amnesia. The long and difficult
departure from binarism – liberal Enlightenment against “feudal empire” –
offers new perspectives from which to approach Chinese history, from the
longest to the most recent. 
This change of historical perspective finally offers the possibility of a
third standpoint, that of a new world perception that lays the foundation
for a new relationship with the West. For example, on one end of the spec-
trum a Chinese, national cultural approach is emerging, of which Gan Yang
may be considered a representative, (65) whilst in the centre appears a lib-
eral universalism that, although embattled, continues to deepen its imprint
on society. Jin Guantao, Xu Youyu, Qin Hui (秦暉 born in 1953), Zhu Xueqin
(朱學勤 born in 1952), and Xu Jilin (許紀霖 born in 1957) are doubtless the
most representative of this movement that survives despite a two fold
confusion. Firstly, one associates these liberal intellectuals with the failure
of the 1989 social movement and the “Westernist” fervour (西方主義 – xi-
fangzhuyi) of the past decade. Secondly, they are frequently condemned in
the name of the harmful social effects of economic (neo)liberalism. We
can clearly understand the confusion – intentional and strategic – main-
tained by their opponents. (66)
Lastly, at the other end of the spectrum, we note the appearance of a
radical, anticapitalist anti-globalization movement that advocates going
beyond the nation-state, by rehabilitating, if need be, certain aspects of a
hitherto irreclaimable Maoist past. Wang Hui is perhaps the best-known of
the representatives of this critique who would like to move Chinese social
protest closer to the movement against world economic neoliberalism
born of the social excesses of capitalist globalisation, if need be by moving
outside the traditional framework of analysis, generally of Western ori-
gin. (67) This constitutes the third essential element in the consolidation of
positions directly stemming from the debates of the preceding decade for
which the pages of the Hong Kong journal were the theatre. 
The exceptional richness of Ershiyi shiji, (68) its acuity regarding the fun-
damental problems of Chinese transition, together with its permanent ex-
amination of the international situation enables us to foresee, without too
much risk of being mistaken, a very bright future for the journal. It would
therefore seem only natural for China Perspectives, founded at around the
same time, to join in the celebration.
z Translated by Elizabeth Guill
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Mass., Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 3-39. 
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